Showing posts with label Turkmenistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkmenistan. Show all posts
[ENERGY MEETING] Declarations of Kiev Energy Summit are a desperate cry of ineffective allies of the West- Modest Kolerov
Published | 05-Jun-2008
The last may 22-23, an energy summit was held in Kiev. Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Baltic countries, Poland and EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs took part in the meeting, as well as delegates from other countries including an observer from the United States. A REGNUM correspondent asked the head of Svobodnaya Rossiya (The Free Russia) Foundation, the former head of the Presidential Department for Interregional and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries Modest Kolerov to comment on the outcomes of the Kiev summit.
REGNUM: Mr. Kolerov, what is the political sense in the documents signed at the Kiev summit?
The political sense in the documents signed at the summit is a bureaucratic (and by this moment exclusively bureaucratic) fixation of the intention of the countries transiting and receiving gas from Russia to become part of the system of external control over the sources per se. Their economy of transit is not self-efficient in its core, their policy is one of a reptile, it is instrumental; their political will is a derivative from the will of external power centers. In those conditions, they are trying to sell twice their declarations at external markets: to their Euro-Atlantic sponsors and Eurasian rivals (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) that are building their own relations with the Euro-Atlantic centers directly. To cut it short, the declarations of the Kiev summit are a desperate cry of ineffective allies of the West, almost each of them is under serious problems of crises of their internal regimes. It is a cry of those willing to draw attention to themselves, willing to assume any mediator or, in the opposite, an alternative to Russia role for the sake of survival. Presence of a US observer must not mislead us about the true value of those declarations. For curators, they are just a low-paid element of the traditional Russia detention policy. Those declarations will not be funded by the West, thus they will remain declarations.
REGNUM: The Energy Summit in Kiev was preceded by talks of the Azerbaijani and Turkmen presidents in Baku. How possible is it that Ashgabat would join the “alternative energy corridor,” particularly, by backing the idea of constructing a Trans-Caspian pipeline?
The Trans-Caspian pipeline, as well as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan's maneuvers in the energy market and their transportation, anyway it is not a project of even tomorrow. All those tricks regarding the amounts of reserves and routes are aimed today, first of all, at influencing some macro-indices of the Eurasian energy policy market; it is a struggle for improving negotiation positions, bargaining, blackmailing, or if you like, the “Oriental politeness” not known by the West, but very well known by us.
The aim of this politeness is to increase ones political gains where it is practically impossible in the economic terms of view. Kazakhstan's economic difficulties, a close perspective of Azerbaijan starting its oil extraction, dubious assessments of the reserves in Turkmenistan and inevitable huge costs of the country's transformation, all this is exacerbated by the background of the global inflation and the crisis of financial tools and makes those resources-dependent countries look (or look on behalf of them) for an artificial dialog with “democratic” resources-bankrupt countries. The total price of the game is capitulation of the “democratic” European Narcisses towards the resources-reach Asia, as it was clearly stated that without Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the Baltic — Black Sea — Caspian Project has no chances. In this situation, “the globally historical transit alliance” that plans to supply energy resources to Europe not by the natural way — with participation of Turkey and Russia, but under the fantastic parabola from Central Asia to Ukraine and the Baltic Sea is another Utopia. It may sound funny, but such a strategy can be drawn on a school globe, but not in the economy.
REGNUM: Judging by the outcomes of the summit, Kiev's key proposal was to construct a major refinery plant for Caspian oil in the Ukrainian territory that, to all appearances, must be delivered through the Odessa-Brody-Hdansk-Plock pipeline which is under construction yet. How real is the project, to your mind?
I am not an expert in Ukrainian oil refining, but I would like to stress that even declared, not contracted free Azerbaijani oil will not be enough to fill the major export pipe — the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. If in the shadow of these talks Azerbaijan manages to take under its control a part of the Ukrainian fuel market and thus capitalize part of its free financial reserves and to some extent diversify their economy, one can congratulate it with a successful bargain. Ukraine, despite its resource bankruptcy and the transit crisis, still remains a big consumer market.
REGNUM: Was coincidental that the Energy Summit took place at the same time when the official Kiev became active on the Black Sea Fleet issue?
It was not. These are long ago coordinated Euro-Atlantic plans. It is another matter that their implementation remains bureaucratic most of all. The less there is real economy in them the more there is conflict policy.
REGNUM: Azerbaijani experts believe that the Azeri Caspian shelf has no potential to fill both the BTC and the planned route in Ukraine. Actually, they state that Kiev can be given oil only in case Turkey is deprived of it. If this way of posing the question is right, what Ilham Aliyev expects while signing the documents in Kiev?
The Kiev activists and their American curators are astonishingly presumptuous about Turkey: the edge of the Kiev declarations is economically directed mostly against Turkey as a transit country and consumer of energy resources. Special attention in this context should be paid to the Azeri-Turkish union. Probably, that is why Baku gave all necessary assurances to Ankara that there would be no re-orientation of energy routes in reality.
Source: REGNUM
[ASIA] Azerbaijan displays no interest in Trans-Afghan gas pipeline project
Published | 13-May-2008
Azerbaijan displays no interest in the project of construction of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, as told Azerbaijan's Minister of Industry and Energy Natiq Aliyev. He said because the pipeline passes a region of tensions, its construction is unreal at present."Perhaps, the project will be implemented after the situation in the region is improved". It should be noted that Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India signed a framework agreement on construction of the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline to supply Turkmen gas to South Asia.
The construction is to be initiated in 2010 and the first gas supplies are scheduled for 2015. The cost of the project is estimated at $7,600,000,000. The gas pipeline will extend to 1.68 thousand km and its capacity will be 350 mln cubic meters of gas per day.
It should be reminded that the idea of the gas pipeline construction via Afghanistan has existed for over 10 years, yet tensions in Afghanistan hindered its implementation.
Turkmenistan, which has the largest gas reserves in Central Asia, tries to find ways of diversification of supplies as it has the only way of its exportation by the Russian Gazprom's pipeline system.
Source: Today.AZ
FRANCE: GDF Gaz de France recalled its application for participation in Nabucco gas pipeline project
Published | 18-Mar-2008
Gaz de France (GDF) has recalled its application for participation in Nabucco gas pipeline project, French Trade Minister Herve Novelli said in Istanbul.“We have recalled our application because we think that the decision of the Turkish authorizes was dictated by political reasons,” Mr Novelli said.
Earlier, Turkey vetoed participation of Gaz de France in the project due to adoption of French bill penalizing the Armenian Genocide denial.
The Nabucco pipeline is a planned natural gas pipeline that will transport natural gas from Turkey to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. It will run from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March, a major natural gas hub in Austria. Some consider the pipeline as a diversion from the current methods of importing natural gas solely from Russia.
Nabucco could bring gas supplies from Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Egypt and Syria. It will be connected near Erzurum with the Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline, and with the South Caucasus Pipeline, connecting Nabucco Pipeline with the planned Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. It will run from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria with total length of 3,300 kilometres (2,050 mi). In early years after completion the deliveries are expected to be between 4.5 and 13 billion cubic meters (bcm) per annum, of which 2 to 8 bcm goes to Baumgarten. Later, approximately half of the capacity is expected to be delivered to Baumgarten and half of the natural gas is to serve the markets en-route. The transmission volume of around 2020 is expected to reach 25.5 to 31 bcm per annum, of which up to 16 bcm goes to Baumgarten.
Construction of pipeline is expected to begin in 2009 and is planned to be finished in 2012. It estimated to cost around 4.6 billion EUR (5.8 billion USD). The company leading the project is OMV from Austria.
Source: Panarmenian
PERSIAN GULF: Uzbekistan to be linked to Persian Gulf via Iran
Published | 26-Feb-2008
Uzbekistan will have access to the Persian Gulf through Iran, wrote Turkmen weekly `Zaman Turkmenistan' in its latest issue.The weekly said that Uzbekistan's railways and roads will be linked to the Persian Gulf through the Uzbek Republic's Termez city and Afghanistan's Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat cities.
It said Uzbekistan's link to Persian Gulf will cut the distance and expedite cargo transportation between Iran and the Uzbek Republic. He said presently European and Asian states are linked to Uzbekistan through the Iran-Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan railway.
Source: Islamic Republic News Agency
EUROASIA: The energy war. Gazprom and Europe
Published | 21-Feb-2008
Russia will encounter natural gas deficit in the short-term perspective. Western experts state: despite vast deposits, just in some seven years Russia will no longer be able to satisfy even its own demand for energy resources, not to mention the supplies to Europe’s market, where there has been no alternative to Russia’s gas yet.
Neither to Oneself, Nor to Europe
Europe satisfies over the half of its demand for natural gas by means of Russian supplies. Russia’s share in Europe’s import was expected to double in absolute terms by 2030. However, it is now questionable whether Russia is capable to maintain and increase the amount of gas supplies.
European analysts say the major part of Russian oil and gas is extracted from a small number of large but already old deposits. The extraction is falling, while gas consumption in Russia is rapidly growing. If the trend persists, Russia will simply be unable to carry out its contract obligations mapped out till 2010.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes that Russia needs to open up new deposits in order to maintain at least the current level of supplies. Considering the severe climate and the remoteness from chief transport junctions and market outlets, new deposits’ development requires building new infrastructure. Meanwhile, Gazprom now has neither the necessary technologies, nor enough means (the International Energy Agency estimated the exploration of new deposits will require investment of at least $11 billion annually). Despite all the five-year economic development plans adopted between 1991 and 2006, the company has never allocated significant funds for implementing them. So, there is nothing unexpected in the prognosis that Russian gas export will reduce by 25 percent by 2015.
“Gazprom is undergoing a crisis now,” said Michael Fredholm, expert of Conflict Studies Research Center, UK Defense Academy. According to the International Energy Agency , the Russian company is losing at least 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually due to the lack of proper funding. The losses, comparable to one fifth of Russia’s export to Europe, are caused by technologic drawbacks and outdated transport infrastructure, which often leads to gas leaks and inflammation.
Gazprom and Russian officials more and more often have to deny that Europe’s energy supply is at risk. Yet, they give no clear answer to the question about how Russia is going to manage the growing domestic demand without impinging upon the obligations to European counteragents.
Russia’s authorities hope to decrease the domestic market’s gas consumption by means of switching some Russian consumers to coal. “It will trigger higher prices on electric energy, but will help Gazprom to manage its energy supply obligations to the foreign market for a while,” reads Fredholm’s report. However, even a large-scale transfer of the domestic market to coal will not make it much easier for Russia to fulfill all of its export and domestic obligations.
Speaking of export difficulties, Russia will be trying to solve them by means of Central Asian gas, which it buys at low prices from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and, taking advantage of its monopolistic transit position, resells to Western consumers three times more expensively. Anyway, even if Gazprom succeeds in keeping up extraction at 560 billion cubic meters annually (which is impossible without investment in new deposits), and in increasing Central Asian supplies up to 70 billion cubic meters, it will not guarantee the export obligations’ fulfillment, reads the report by Swiss investment bank UBS, presented in summer 2006.
No-Alternative Choice
Europe began questioning the reliability of its major supplier with the start of Russia-Ukraine gas wars. Certainly, Russia uses its dominating position on the energy resources market for achieving its political purposes. However, it now concerns more basic issues: there will simply be not enough Russian gas for all consumers.
From now on, the decrease in Russia’s supplies means not only political independence, but also basic survival for many European states. European Union countries have been hatching long-standing plans for diversifying the supply sources by means of gaining direct access to Central Asian and Caspian deposits. However, the Russian government has been successfully counteracting all those plans, for the energy competition will reduce not only prices of energy resources, but also Russia’s political weight. According to European Union plans, the Nabucco gas pipeline is to open the access to gas deposits bypassing Russia. Nabucco’s construction was scheduled to be launched in 2007.
The new pipeline is to carry gas from the Caspian region (mainly from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) through Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria; the latter will distribute gas to other European consumers. “If there is a project capable to rid Europe of Russian dependence, than it is Nabucco,” experts said. However, in late 1990s, when Nabucco was just mentioned for the first time, Moscow began building its Blue Stream gas pipeline along the Black Sea bed to Turkey. Upon finishing it, Russia announced a new plan for extending it from Turkey to Europe (Blue Stream 2). Russia’s project was becoming Nabucco’s chief rival.
Soon afterwards, Moscow began enticing the European project’s investors. Austria will become Europe’s chief energy-distributing center if the Nabucco plan is implemented. Russia promised that favorable strategic position to Hungary, if the latter agrees to take part in the Blue Stream 2 project. The policy of dividing and ruling brought its fruit. Although Hungary’s oil-and-gas company MOL is a member of Nabucco Consortium, MOL signed in June 2006 an agreement with Gazprom for laying the gas pipeline from Turkey through the Balkans to Hungary. In March 2007, Hungary’s Prime Minister Ferenz Durchan said: “Nabucco is a big dream, but we don’t need dreams, we need projects”.
Neither to Oneself, Nor to Europe
Europe satisfies over the half of its demand for natural gas by means of Russian supplies. Russia’s share in Europe’s import was expected to double in absolute terms by 2030. However, it is now questionable whether Russia is capable to maintain and increase the amount of gas supplies.
European analysts say the major part of Russian oil and gas is extracted from a small number of large but already old deposits. The extraction is falling, while gas consumption in Russia is rapidly growing. If the trend persists, Russia will simply be unable to carry out its contract obligations mapped out till 2010.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes that Russia needs to open up new deposits in order to maintain at least the current level of supplies. Considering the severe climate and the remoteness from chief transport junctions and market outlets, new deposits’ development requires building new infrastructure. Meanwhile, Gazprom now has neither the necessary technologies, nor enough means (the International Energy Agency estimated the exploration of new deposits will require investment of at least $11 billion annually). Despite all the five-year economic development plans adopted between 1991 and 2006, the company has never allocated significant funds for implementing them. So, there is nothing unexpected in the prognosis that Russian gas export will reduce by 25 percent by 2015.
“Gazprom is undergoing a crisis now,” said Michael Fredholm, expert of Conflict Studies Research Center, UK Defense Academy. According to the International Energy Agency , the Russian company is losing at least 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually due to the lack of proper funding. The losses, comparable to one fifth of Russia’s export to Europe, are caused by technologic drawbacks and outdated transport infrastructure, which often leads to gas leaks and inflammation.
Gazprom and Russian officials more and more often have to deny that Europe’s energy supply is at risk. Yet, they give no clear answer to the question about how Russia is going to manage the growing domestic demand without impinging upon the obligations to European counteragents.
Russia’s authorities hope to decrease the domestic market’s gas consumption by means of switching some Russian consumers to coal. “It will trigger higher prices on electric energy, but will help Gazprom to manage its energy supply obligations to the foreign market for a while,” reads Fredholm’s report. However, even a large-scale transfer of the domestic market to coal will not make it much easier for Russia to fulfill all of its export and domestic obligations.
Speaking of export difficulties, Russia will be trying to solve them by means of Central Asian gas, which it buys at low prices from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and, taking advantage of its monopolistic transit position, resells to Western consumers three times more expensively. Anyway, even if Gazprom succeeds in keeping up extraction at 560 billion cubic meters annually (which is impossible without investment in new deposits), and in increasing Central Asian supplies up to 70 billion cubic meters, it will not guarantee the export obligations’ fulfillment, reads the report by Swiss investment bank UBS, presented in summer 2006.
No-Alternative Choice
Europe began questioning the reliability of its major supplier with the start of Russia-Ukraine gas wars. Certainly, Russia uses its dominating position on the energy resources market for achieving its political purposes. However, it now concerns more basic issues: there will simply be not enough Russian gas for all consumers.
From now on, the decrease in Russia’s supplies means not only political independence, but also basic survival for many European states. European Union countries have been hatching long-standing plans for diversifying the supply sources by means of gaining direct access to Central Asian and Caspian deposits. However, the Russian government has been successfully counteracting all those plans, for the energy competition will reduce not only prices of energy resources, but also Russia’s political weight. According to European Union plans, the Nabucco gas pipeline is to open the access to gas deposits bypassing Russia. Nabucco’s construction was scheduled to be launched in 2007.
The new pipeline is to carry gas from the Caspian region (mainly from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) through Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria; the latter will distribute gas to other European consumers. “If there is a project capable to rid Europe of Russian dependence, than it is Nabucco,” experts said. However, in late 1990s, when Nabucco was just mentioned for the first time, Moscow began building its Blue Stream gas pipeline along the Black Sea bed to Turkey. Upon finishing it, Russia announced a new plan for extending it from Turkey to Europe (Blue Stream 2). Russia’s project was becoming Nabucco’s chief rival.
Soon afterwards, Moscow began enticing the European project’s investors. Austria will become Europe’s chief energy-distributing center if the Nabucco plan is implemented. Russia promised that favorable strategic position to Hungary, if the latter agrees to take part in the Blue Stream 2 project. The policy of dividing and ruling brought its fruit. Although Hungary’s oil-and-gas company MOL is a member of Nabucco Consortium, MOL signed in June 2006 an agreement with Gazprom for laying the gas pipeline from Turkey through the Balkans to Hungary. In March 2007, Hungary’s Prime Minister Ferenz Durchan said: “Nabucco is a big dream, but we don’t need dreams, we need projects”.
However, the pipeline’s route changed drastically when Turkey decided not to support it, and openly backed the alternative Nabucco pipeline. Moscow decided to build its pipeline (now called South Stream) directly from Russia to Bulgaria, along the Black Sea bed, and to attract Italy’s Eni to funding it. South Stream is to split into two pipelines in Bulgaria. One will lead through Serbia and Hungary to Austria, and the other – through Greece to Italy’s south (see map).
Gazprom does not hide its hurry to implement the South Stream project due to its direct competition with Nabucco. The chief European pipeline’s construction was put off many times due to differences between the states involved and to the uncertainty with suppliers. It is now scheduled for 2009. Yet, even with the most favorable circumstances, Nabucco will not be put into service earlier than in 2012.
Europe’s another hope is to build the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. However, Moscow has been successfully blocking this one as well.
According to the project, the pipeline is to transport gas from the eastern Caspian shore along the seabed to Azerbaijan, then to Turkey, from where it can be carried to European consumers (by means of Nabucco, for instance). Yet, there is no consensus between the five Caspian states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia – on how to divide Caspian energy resources. Taking advantage of the uncertainty of the Caspian Sea’s legal status, Russian politicians said that regardless of where the pipeline begins, all five countries in question should give their consent to its construction.
Beside Russia, Iran strongly opposes the Trans-Caspian project as well. In July 2001, the Iranian authorities sent a military ship to prevent exploration works in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian shore. The works were being carried out by BP under a contract with Azerbaijan. The West admits of a possibility that the Kremlin might be sponsoring such irreconcilable position, although Iran certainly has its own reasons for not letting Europeans near the Caspian Sea.
Experts say that Moscow does everything to block EU states’ access to cheaper energy resources. In 2006, Gazprom was in cooperation talks with Algerian company Sonatrach, second largest gas supplier to Europe’s market after Russia. It is unnecessary to say how much that circumstance disturbed European consumers.
Inter-State Split-Up
Experts agree on one point: Europe needs to give up inner competition in the gas sphere and act as a united front if it wants to weaken such energy monster as Russia. However, each European country has been so far trying to peg gas supplies for itself only.
In winter 2005-06, when energy supplies to Europe were at risk, Germany signed an agreement with Russia on building a new gas pipeline – Nord Stream – allowing to transport gas directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. Having learned about it, Polish President Alexander Kvasnevsky compared it to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Anyway, despite the energy arm-twisting opportunities which Moscow acquires with Nord Stream, Germany has secured its energy safety.
Other European states behave in a similar way. They hurried to sign bilateral agreements with Russia. In the last two years, Gazprom signed contracts with Italian, French, and Dutch oil-and-gas companies, whose playing against one another allows Russia to push for more favorable terms and to receive larger profits. According to apt statement by Zeyno Baran, director of Hudson’s Center for Eurasian Policy, “while Europe is trying to coordinate its actions, Putin is signing deals”.
Gazprom does not hide its hurry to implement the South Stream project due to its direct competition with Nabucco. The chief European pipeline’s construction was put off many times due to differences between the states involved and to the uncertainty with suppliers. It is now scheduled for 2009. Yet, even with the most favorable circumstances, Nabucco will not be put into service earlier than in 2012.
Europe’s another hope is to build the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. However, Moscow has been successfully blocking this one as well.
According to the project, the pipeline is to transport gas from the eastern Caspian shore along the seabed to Azerbaijan, then to Turkey, from where it can be carried to European consumers (by means of Nabucco, for instance). Yet, there is no consensus between the five Caspian states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia – on how to divide Caspian energy resources. Taking advantage of the uncertainty of the Caspian Sea’s legal status, Russian politicians said that regardless of where the pipeline begins, all five countries in question should give their consent to its construction.
Beside Russia, Iran strongly opposes the Trans-Caspian project as well. In July 2001, the Iranian authorities sent a military ship to prevent exploration works in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian shore. The works were being carried out by BP under a contract with Azerbaijan. The West admits of a possibility that the Kremlin might be sponsoring such irreconcilable position, although Iran certainly has its own reasons for not letting Europeans near the Caspian Sea.
Experts say that Moscow does everything to block EU states’ access to cheaper energy resources. In 2006, Gazprom was in cooperation talks with Algerian company Sonatrach, second largest gas supplier to Europe’s market after Russia. It is unnecessary to say how much that circumstance disturbed European consumers.
Inter-State Split-Up
Experts agree on one point: Europe needs to give up inner competition in the gas sphere and act as a united front if it wants to weaken such energy monster as Russia. However, each European country has been so far trying to peg gas supplies for itself only.
In winter 2005-06, when energy supplies to Europe were at risk, Germany signed an agreement with Russia on building a new gas pipeline – Nord Stream – allowing to transport gas directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. Having learned about it, Polish President Alexander Kvasnevsky compared it to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Anyway, despite the energy arm-twisting opportunities which Moscow acquires with Nord Stream, Germany has secured its energy safety.
Other European states behave in a similar way. They hurried to sign bilateral agreements with Russia. In the last two years, Gazprom signed contracts with Italian, French, and Dutch oil-and-gas companies, whose playing against one another allows Russia to push for more favorable terms and to receive larger profits. According to apt statement by Zeyno Baran, director of Hudson’s Center for Eurasian Policy, “while Europe is trying to coordinate its actions, Putin is signing deals”.
Source: Kommersant|Maria Klochkova
GEOPOLITIC: Kazakhstan rules oceans
Published | 20-Feb-2008Awash in oil revenues, the Kazakh government is now to spend some of its lucre on a pressing defense need that its military planners have overlooked since independence in 1991 -- a navy.
In a military development largely unnoticed in the West, Kazakh Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov said last October, "This is a very serious issue. We have a blueprint for developing the navy. We have set up a directorate for naval forces, which will function within the Defense Ministry from 1 January next year."
In March 1992 the former Soviet Union's minuscule Caspian navy was divided up among Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In late 1993 Kazakhstan received about 25 percent. Planning for the Kazakh navy actually began in 1994. After a year and a half of consultations, in January 1996, Russia and Kazakhstan signed military cooperation agreements, which included Russian assistance in developing a Kazakh maritime force.
Certainly, the hardy Kazakh sailors have something to defend, as some analysts believe the Caspian could hold "possible reserves" of up to 250 billion barrels of oil, along with potential reserves of more than 200 billion barrels. With oil hovering at nearly $100 a barrel, the value of Caspian energy deposits stands at more than $4 trillion; estimates of the region's natural gas deposits stand at 325 trillion cubic feet.
The Kazakh navy is going to have to constrain its blue-water activities to the Caspian, however. The Caspian's sole egress is via the 37-mile Volga-Don Canal. The channel is the least known of the world's strategic waterways, but it provides a maritime link between the Volga, which empties into the Caspian, and the Don River, which disgorges into the Sea of Azov, a northeast corollary of the Black Sea, which in turn provides access via the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean and from there the "world ocean." Unfortunately for Kazakh admirals, the Volga-Don Canal can only handle ships of up to 5,000 tons, and in some places is less than 12 feet deep, which somewhat limits the size of the nation's battle fleet. An alternative might appear in the future, however, as in June 2007 Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed an alternative Eurasia Canal project across Russia's North Caucasus, which would shorten shipping routes by nearly 600 miles.
The mission of Kazakhstan's new maritime force will be similar to those of Russia's and Iran's -- to contradict smuggling and guard against terrorism. The terrorism mission has been uppermost on Kazakh officials' minds; in February 2003 Kazakh First Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Abuseitov told reporters Kazakhstan needed a navy that "could fight against new threats, primarily terrorism. Nobody is insured against the possibility that the Caspian could become, in future, an arena of terrorist acts, a place of drug transit, illegal arms trade and even illegal migration."
It may also be called upon to defend Kazakh claims to its self-proclaimed Caspian waters, as the sea's maritime boundaries have yet to be definitively resolved by Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan. Differing perceptions in what defines Caspian national waters has already led to armed confrontation. On July 23, 2001, an Iranian military aircraft, supported by a warship, forced two Azerbaijani vessels contracted by consortium operator BP to quit surveying at the Alov-Araz-Sharg field, a site that Azerbaijan claimed was well within its national sector, but disputed by Iran, which claims the Caspian's legal status must be based on the Iranian-Soviet treaties of 1921 and 1940.
Perhaps inevitably, Kazakhstan has received outside offers of assistance in developing its maritime muscle. Since 1997 it has received 10 ships from the United States and Germany, and last November Robert Simmons, the NATO secretary-general's special representative for Central Asia and the Caucasus, offered the alliance's assistance, telling reporters, "During my last visit to Kazakhstan, I held talks with Kazakh Defense Minister (Daniyal Akhmetov) on this and several other issues. I visited Aktau, where Kazakhstan intends to set up its fleet, and we are ready to help you create this fleet."
The Kazakh government is carefully considering its options. Akhmetov said, "Today, we work with Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and French companies. The ministry will soon make a final decision on the acquisition and the production of equipment. Russia has made very good proposals, including on a vessel that is unrivaled in the world. France and Turkey have made good proposals as well. The ministry now has to choose."
Despite the blandishments of Moscow, NATO and Washington, pragmatism seems to be guiding Kazakhstan's maritime choices at the moment, and Astana as yet seems to have no plans to acquire carriers or ballistic submarines. Given Kazakhstan's rising oil revenues, though, probably nothing is off the table.
In a military development largely unnoticed in the West, Kazakh Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov said last October, "This is a very serious issue. We have a blueprint for developing the navy. We have set up a directorate for naval forces, which will function within the Defense Ministry from 1 January next year."
In March 1992 the former Soviet Union's minuscule Caspian navy was divided up among Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In late 1993 Kazakhstan received about 25 percent. Planning for the Kazakh navy actually began in 1994. After a year and a half of consultations, in January 1996, Russia and Kazakhstan signed military cooperation agreements, which included Russian assistance in developing a Kazakh maritime force.
Certainly, the hardy Kazakh sailors have something to defend, as some analysts believe the Caspian could hold "possible reserves" of up to 250 billion barrels of oil, along with potential reserves of more than 200 billion barrels. With oil hovering at nearly $100 a barrel, the value of Caspian energy deposits stands at more than $4 trillion; estimates of the region's natural gas deposits stand at 325 trillion cubic feet.
The Kazakh navy is going to have to constrain its blue-water activities to the Caspian, however. The Caspian's sole egress is via the 37-mile Volga-Don Canal. The channel is the least known of the world's strategic waterways, but it provides a maritime link between the Volga, which empties into the Caspian, and the Don River, which disgorges into the Sea of Azov, a northeast corollary of the Black Sea, which in turn provides access via the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean and from there the "world ocean." Unfortunately for Kazakh admirals, the Volga-Don Canal can only handle ships of up to 5,000 tons, and in some places is less than 12 feet deep, which somewhat limits the size of the nation's battle fleet. An alternative might appear in the future, however, as in June 2007 Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed an alternative Eurasia Canal project across Russia's North Caucasus, which would shorten shipping routes by nearly 600 miles.
The mission of Kazakhstan's new maritime force will be similar to those of Russia's and Iran's -- to contradict smuggling and guard against terrorism. The terrorism mission has been uppermost on Kazakh officials' minds; in February 2003 Kazakh First Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Abuseitov told reporters Kazakhstan needed a navy that "could fight against new threats, primarily terrorism. Nobody is insured against the possibility that the Caspian could become, in future, an arena of terrorist acts, a place of drug transit, illegal arms trade and even illegal migration."
It may also be called upon to defend Kazakh claims to its self-proclaimed Caspian waters, as the sea's maritime boundaries have yet to be definitively resolved by Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan. Differing perceptions in what defines Caspian national waters has already led to armed confrontation. On July 23, 2001, an Iranian military aircraft, supported by a warship, forced two Azerbaijani vessels contracted by consortium operator BP to quit surveying at the Alov-Araz-Sharg field, a site that Azerbaijan claimed was well within its national sector, but disputed by Iran, which claims the Caspian's legal status must be based on the Iranian-Soviet treaties of 1921 and 1940.
Perhaps inevitably, Kazakhstan has received outside offers of assistance in developing its maritime muscle. Since 1997 it has received 10 ships from the United States and Germany, and last November Robert Simmons, the NATO secretary-general's special representative for Central Asia and the Caucasus, offered the alliance's assistance, telling reporters, "During my last visit to Kazakhstan, I held talks with Kazakh Defense Minister (Daniyal Akhmetov) on this and several other issues. I visited Aktau, where Kazakhstan intends to set up its fleet, and we are ready to help you create this fleet."
The Kazakh government is carefully considering its options. Akhmetov said, "Today, we work with Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and French companies. The ministry will soon make a final decision on the acquisition and the production of equipment. Russia has made very good proposals, including on a vessel that is unrivaled in the world. France and Turkey have made good proposals as well. The ministry now has to choose."
Despite the blandishments of Moscow, NATO and Washington, pragmatism seems to be guiding Kazakhstan's maritime choices at the moment, and Astana as yet seems to have no plans to acquire carriers or ballistic submarines. Given Kazakhstan's rising oil revenues, though, probably nothing is off the table.
Source: United Press International
EUROASIA: Ukraine and Russia. Gas Talks Come Down to The Wire
Published | 12-Feb-2008
Emergency talks between Gazprom and Ukraine failed to resolve a simmering debt dispute Monday as the possibility of a mid-winter shut-off of gas supplies to the country inched closer.Gazprom moved its cut-off deadline back eight hours, saying after the talks that it would give Ukraine's state gas firm Naftogaz until 6 p.m. Tuesday to pay in full a debt it says totals $1.5 billion. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller and Naftogaz chief Oleh Dubyna held three hours of talks as officials in Kiev and Moscow traded barbs over who was to blame for the dispute and what the actual size of the debt was.
Officials on both sides insisted that Gazprom's supplies to Europe through Ukrainian territory would not be affected.
Talks would continue until the deadline Tuesday, Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov said, after which Gazprom is threatening to shut the valves to Ukraine. The current spat is reminiscent of a similar standoff in early 2006 that first called into question Russia's reliability as an energy supplier to European markets.
A two-day visit by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, which had already been scheduled for Tuesday, will now likely turn into a last-ditch effort on Kiev's part.
Analysts said the debt dispute masked a deeper tussle over the role of RosUkrEnergo, a trading company owned 50-50 by Gazprom and a pair of Ukrainian businessmen. The company mixes Gazprom supplies with cheaper gas from Central Asia to keep prices low.
Gazprom insists that Naftogaz owes it $1.5 billion -- $1 billion in unpaid bills from 2007 and $500 million since the beginning of this year -- because Gazprom has boosted its share of supplies to Ukraine as shipments from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have dwindled during an unusually harsh winter there.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko put the debt at $1.1 billion on Monday and said it was owed to RosUkrEnergo, blaming the build up of arrears on her predecessor, Viktor Yanukovich, and former energy minister Yuriy Boiko.
"As the Yanukovich government and Boiko left this debt, I believe Boiko, who now represents RosUkrEnergo, must do all he can so this debt can be restructured over a long period," she said, news agencies reported from Kiev. "Ukraine will not pay this debt all at once."
In a suggestion that Ukraine was looking for ways to stretch repayment of the debt over a longer period, Kommersant reported Tuesday that Naftogaz was negotiating with Deutsche Bank for a $1 billion loan, citing senior officials with the company.
Tymoshenko also said that, in calculating the debt, RosUkrEnergo had applied the price agreed for 2008 -- $179.50 per 1,000 cubic meters -- to November and December 2007, when the price stood at $130. Ukraine will not "fall victim to blackmail," she said.
RosUkrEnergo, which took over the murky Russian-Ukrainian gas trade following the 2006 dispute, remained defiant Monday.
"I don't think it is standard global practice to receive a product and not pay for it," spokesman Andrei Knutov said by telephone.
Tymoshenko once held close links to former intermediary company Itera, which handled the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade before 2002. She has long been pushing for the dissolution of RosUkrEnergo and said Monday that she would use a visit to Moscow later this month to urge direct sales from Gazprom to Naftogaz.
Ukraine, with an annual demand for gas of 75 billion cubic meters, buys 55 bcm from RosUkrEnergo and covers the rest with domestic production. Under normal conditions, the bulk of RosUkrEnergo's supplies -- 41 bcm -- comes from Turkmenistan, with the remaining 25 percent supplied by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Gazprom, Knutov said.
If Gazprom and Naftogaz failed to resolve the dispute by 6 p.m. Tuesday, Gazprom would halt only its supplies to Ukraine, which currently comprise 25 percent of RosUkrEnergo's shipments, Kupriyanov told Ekho Moskvy.
The 2006 dispute saw Gazprom cut all gas shipments to Ukraine, prompting a drop in supplies across Europe, which relies on Russia for one-quarter of its gas imports. Around 80 percent of Gazprom's supplies to Europe cross Ukraine.
To counter the effects of a price rise that would likely result from direct sales from Moscow to Kiev, Ukrainian officials are believed to be seeking a hike in gas transit payments.
"Transit costs are a separate issue," Gazprom Export spokesman Ilya Kochevrin said. "That's about European gas supply; this is about local Ukrainian consumption." Gazprom currently pays $1.7 per thousand cubic meters of gas for every 100 kilometers it travels.
RosUkrEnergo's Knutov said Ukraine had a contractual obligation to continue using RosUkrEnergo. Reports at the time it was signed said the contract was for five years.
"Today is a moment of truth for Ukraine," Tymoshenko said, The Associated Press reported. "Either it manages to get rid of all these gas tumors and manages to cut this Gordian knot, or RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo, these twin brothers, will make us dependent for many, many years."
Gazprom sells its gas to RosUkrEnergo, which then resells it to another intermediary, UkrGazEnergo. That company sells the gas to Ukrainian industrial consumers and Ukraine's national energy company, Naftogaz, which supplies households and other consumers.
The dispute's escalation came as Gazprom was due to hold a huge 15th anniversary bash in the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin congratulated the firm on its anniversary in a letter on Monday, saying, "The company's strategy is built on the principles of uninterrupted, reliable and maximally efficient supplies to consumers in Russia and abroad."
"As the Yanukovich government and Boiko left this debt, I believe Boiko, who now represents RosUkrEnergo, must do all he can so this debt can be restructured over a long period," she said, news agencies reported from Kiev. "Ukraine will not pay this debt all at once."
In a suggestion that Ukraine was looking for ways to stretch repayment of the debt over a longer period, Kommersant reported Tuesday that Naftogaz was negotiating with Deutsche Bank for a $1 billion loan, citing senior officials with the company.
Tymoshenko also said that, in calculating the debt, RosUkrEnergo had applied the price agreed for 2008 -- $179.50 per 1,000 cubic meters -- to November and December 2007, when the price stood at $130. Ukraine will not "fall victim to blackmail," she said.
RosUkrEnergo, which took over the murky Russian-Ukrainian gas trade following the 2006 dispute, remained defiant Monday.
"I don't think it is standard global practice to receive a product and not pay for it," spokesman Andrei Knutov said by telephone.
Tymoshenko once held close links to former intermediary company Itera, which handled the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade before 2002. She has long been pushing for the dissolution of RosUkrEnergo and said Monday that she would use a visit to Moscow later this month to urge direct sales from Gazprom to Naftogaz.
Ukraine, with an annual demand for gas of 75 billion cubic meters, buys 55 bcm from RosUkrEnergo and covers the rest with domestic production. Under normal conditions, the bulk of RosUkrEnergo's supplies -- 41 bcm -- comes from Turkmenistan, with the remaining 25 percent supplied by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Gazprom, Knutov said.
If Gazprom and Naftogaz failed to resolve the dispute by 6 p.m. Tuesday, Gazprom would halt only its supplies to Ukraine, which currently comprise 25 percent of RosUkrEnergo's shipments, Kupriyanov told Ekho Moskvy.
The 2006 dispute saw Gazprom cut all gas shipments to Ukraine, prompting a drop in supplies across Europe, which relies on Russia for one-quarter of its gas imports. Around 80 percent of Gazprom's supplies to Europe cross Ukraine.
To counter the effects of a price rise that would likely result from direct sales from Moscow to Kiev, Ukrainian officials are believed to be seeking a hike in gas transit payments.
"Transit costs are a separate issue," Gazprom Export spokesman Ilya Kochevrin said. "That's about European gas supply; this is about local Ukrainian consumption." Gazprom currently pays $1.7 per thousand cubic meters of gas for every 100 kilometers it travels.
RosUkrEnergo's Knutov said Ukraine had a contractual obligation to continue using RosUkrEnergo. Reports at the time it was signed said the contract was for five years.
"Today is a moment of truth for Ukraine," Tymoshenko said, The Associated Press reported. "Either it manages to get rid of all these gas tumors and manages to cut this Gordian knot, or RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo, these twin brothers, will make us dependent for many, many years."
Gazprom sells its gas to RosUkrEnergo, which then resells it to another intermediary, UkrGazEnergo. That company sells the gas to Ukrainian industrial consumers and Ukraine's national energy company, Naftogaz, which supplies households and other consumers.
The dispute's escalation came as Gazprom was due to hold a huge 15th anniversary bash in the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin congratulated the firm on its anniversary in a letter on Monday, saying, "The company's strategy is built on the principles of uninterrupted, reliable and maximally efficient supplies to consumers in Russia and abroad."
Source: The Moscow Times|By Miriam Elder